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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE 
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION ACT 
LAUREN E. TRIBBLE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Generally, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is available to only the most 
desperate individual debtors who do not have the means to pay their 
creditors back over time. Before 2005, the Bankruptcy Code gave 
judges discretion to decide which debtors were eligible for Chapter 7. 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, however, curtails this 
discretion, mandating that judges use a rigid means test to determine 
when a debtor is allowed to file. This Note argues that it was a poor 
decision to foreclose judicial discretion with the means test. It then 
proposes a compromise between the means test approach and the old 
standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, over one million people file for Chapter 71 bankruptcy 
in hope of relief from outstanding debt.2 Chapter 7 is the simplest 
form of bankruptcy: debtors relinquish their unnecessary assets, and 
in exchange, they are allowed to walk away from any remaining 
obligations.3 Most Chapter 7 cases feature down-and-out debtors, 
who, outside of bankruptcy, would probably never have been able to 
repay their creditors.4 In these typical situations, Chapter 7 works to 
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 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 700–785 (2000). 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3–4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90. 
 3. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 149 (5th ed. 2006). 
 4. Id. at 119 (“[T]he great majority of the bankrupt debtors are overwhelmingly in 
debt.”). 
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the benefit of both debtors and creditors. Creditors who were 
unlikely to be repaid outside of bankruptcy receive at least a portion 
of their due, and debtors are left alone to get back on their feet. 
Sometimes, however, debtors ask for an immediate discharge under 
Chapter 7 even though, outside of bankruptcy, they could pay their 
creditors back over time.5 These situations are very different than the 
typical ones. Here, creditors lose out because debtors make a 
conscious choice not to pay what they owe. 
Contrast, for instance, the examples of Shirley Nichols and Kim 
Basinger. Before she became ill, Shirley Nichols was a financially 
responsible woman who, if anything, worked “entirely too hard.”6 In 
her thirties, however, Shirley unexpectedly fell sick and could not 
work for fourteen months.7 While out of work, she charged medical 
bills to her credit cards, eventually building thirty thousand dollars of 
debt.8 Although Shirley ultimately recovered and found a new job, 
she was unable to pay off her debt.9 After “agoniz[ing] over [the 
decision] for a month,” she filed for bankruptcy.10 “I don’t have 
another option,” she told reporters.11 While in bankruptcy, Shirley 
moved into a house with six roommates to cut costs.12 
In contrast, Kim Basinger’s career began as a model.13 By the 
time she was twenty, she was making one thousand dollars per day.14 
Kim later appeared in hundreds of ads, television shows, and 
movies.15 After making Batman in 1989 and The Marrying Man in 
1991, she bought her hometown of Braselton, Georgia, for $20 
million.16 In 1993, however, Kim backed out of a movie contract with 
 
 5. E.g., In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (considering the Chapter 7 petition of 
a debtor with means to pay his creditors back over time). 
 6. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Bankruptcy Law? (PBS television broadcast June 8, 
1998) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june98/bankrupt_6-
8.html). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. The Internet Movie Database, Biography for Kim Basinger, http://www.imdb.com/ 
name/nm0000107/bio (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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her studio.17 The studio sued her, and a jury found her liable for $8.9 
million.18 After the judgment, Kim discharged her debt in 
bankruptcy.19 Although forced to sell Braselton,20 Kim was soon back 
on her feet and made $5 million in 2000 for her movie I Dreamed of 
Africa.21 
Most agree that the Kim Basingers of the world should not be 
allowed to escape their debt through Chapter 7 bankruptcy.22 Such 
individuals do not need bankruptcy protection because they have the 
ability to pay off their debts over time. Chapter 7 should generally be 
reserved for debtors who, like Shirley Nichols, are unable to pay their 
debts outside of bankruptcy and therefore have no other option. The 
disagreements, then, are about how to decide which debtors are able 
to pay23 and about whether there should be any exceptions to the 
general rule that debtors who can pay over time cannot use Chapter 7 
to discharge their debt.24 
Before 2005, the Bankruptcy Code left these questions to 
individual bankruptcy judges.25 Judges determined a debtor’s ability 
to pay under the individual facts and circumstances of each case.26 
Even if a debtor was able to pay, judges had discretion to allow the 
bankruptcy filing if the debt was incurred because of an unexpected 
emergency, such as a medical tragedy.27 Congress placed almost no 
 
 17. Matt Walsh, Boxing Ameritech, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1994, at 18. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Biography for Kim Basinger, supra note 13. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Before 2005, in every circuit but one that addressed the issue, ability to pay was the 
primary factor in deciding whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition. See infra notes 64–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 23. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (measuring ability to pay with an objective 
means test), with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (leaving the ability to pay determination to the 
discretion of bankruptcy judges). 
 24. Compare In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (stipulating that although 
ability to pay is a primary factor, the totality of the circumstances must be considered), with 11 
U.S.C. 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (disallowing any exceptions to the general rule that debtors who 
can pay over time cannot use Chapter 7). 
 25. See generally Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.) (leaving 
discretion to judges). 
 26. E.g., In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 27. See In re Green, 934 F.2d at 572 (including sudden injury, illness, and disability as 
factors to be considered as part of the totality of circumstances for a case). 
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restrictions on these judicial determinations.28 Although judges 
generally exercised their discretion in accord with common sense,29 
the lack of congressional guidance occasionally allowed for outlier 
cases like that of Kim Basinger. 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)30 in part out of 
dissatisfaction with bankruptcy judges and in reaction to cases like 
Basinger’s.31 The BAPCPA almost completely curtails the discretion 
judges had under the previous regime. It mandates that judges 
measure ability to pay using a mechanized objective formula known 
as the means test32 and severely limits judicial discretion to adjust 
means test results.33 
This Note argues that it was a poor decision to completely 
foreclose judicial discretion with the means test. Although judges do 
need more guidelines than they had prior to 2005, the BAPCPA is 
too rigid. The situation demands a compromise between the 
BAPCPA’s approach and the old standard. Part I of this Note 
describes who can file for Chapter 7, noting both what the law used to 
be and what it is under the BAPCPA. Part II points out the flaws in 
the new statute and argues that the BAPCPA’s means test was a 
policy mistake. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for change, 
proposing a compromise between the BAPCPA’s formulaic means 
test and the previous regime. Under this compromise, Congress 
would issue general guidelines about which debtors qualify for 
Chapter 7. Past that, Congress would allow judges discretion to 
 
 28. Although the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act set “substantial 
abuse” as the standard for refusing bankruptcy protection, the statute failed to define 
“substantial abuse.” Id. at 570–71; In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re 
Heller, 160 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993). 
 29. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY 
MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003) (emphasizing that most 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies during the 1980s and 1990s were filed by families under pressure 
because of medical costs, job loss, or divorce). 
 30. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (2005). 
 31. Credit industry lobbyists, Jeff Tassey among them, argued that judicial discretion was 
not a sufficient barrier to bankruptcy abuse. Tassey said of bankruptcy judges, “They’re part of 
the . . . problem. . . . They’re not real judges . . . .” Peter G. Gosselin, Judges Say Overhaul 
Would Weaken Bankruptcy System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005) (establishing the means test). 
 33. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)–(b)(3) (limiting the situations in which judges have discretion to 
allow a bankruptcy petition for a debtor who fails the means test). 
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distinguish between those debtors who need Chapter 7 and those who 
are abusing the bankruptcy system. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF CHAPTER 7 
Traditionally, individual debtors have had two bankruptcy 
options: Chapter 13 and Chapter 7.34 Both options potentially enable 
debtors to discharge a portion of their debt.35 The primary difference 
between Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 is that in Chapter 13, debtors 
promise to make partial payments out of their future income but keep 
their present assets, whereas in Chapter 7, debtors surrender their 
present assets in return for a fresh start going forward.36 
In Chapter 13, debtors promise to turn over a portion of their 
future income for at least three years under a wage earner’s plan.37 
The portion of monthly income that debtors are required to pay is 
based on what they can afford, given their income and reasonable 
expenses.38 Money that debtors turn over under the plan is then used 
to recompense their creditors in order of priority.39 After they 
complete a wage earner’s plan, debtors are no longer liable for their 
remaining debt.40 Debtors who owe over a certain dollar limit, 
however, are ineligible to file for Chapter 13.41 
Alternatively, debtors may elect to pursue an immediate 
discharge of their debt under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 is intended to give 
the “honest but unfortunate” debtor an opportunity for a fresh start.42 
 
 34. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 281. 
 35. See id. (noting both that Chapter 7 debtors can freeze immediate assets and get relief 
from certain future obligations and that Chapter 13 debtors pay future income up to an agreed 
payout amount and subsequently get relief from their remaining obligations). 
 36. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2000) (“Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order 
confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.”), with 11 
U.S.C. § 726(a) (Supp. V 2005) (outlining priority for distribution of present assets).  
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000) (specifying the contents of a wage earner’s plan). 
 38. Id. § 1325(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that all “projected disposable income” be distributed to 
unsecured creditors under the plan and defining “disposable income” as current monthly 
income “less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for certain purposes). 
 39. Id. § 1322(a)(2) (providing for the full payment of all claims entitled to priority). 
 40. Id. § 1328(a) (stating that no discharge will be granted until all payments under the plan 
have been made). 
 41. Id. § 109(e). 
 42. In re Johnson, 318 B.R. 907, 919–20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (“The most fundamental 
goal of the bankruptcy code is to relieve an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor’ of his indebtedness, 
allowing him to make a ‘fresh start.’”); In re Reynolds, 193 B.R. 195, 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996) 
(noting that the Bankruptcy Code’s “overriding purpose” is to afford “honest but unfortunate” 
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The fresh start has a long tradition in American bankruptcy law,43 and 
it has been available to certain American debtors since the enactment 
of the first permanent Bankruptcy Act in 1898.44 Without it, people 
who never expected or intended to incur debt might be forced to 
spend their lives working to pay their creditors, never able to take 
home their own pay.45 At committee hearings on the BAPCPA, 
Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts explained the tradition of a fresh 
start in American bankruptcy law: 
In 1833, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story . . . explained . . . that 
bankruptcy laws were intended to . . . relieve unfortunate and honest 
debtors from perpetual bondage to their creditors. He said that 
bankruptcy legislation should relieve the debtor from a slavery of 
mind and body which robs his family of the fruits of his labor. 
One hundred years later, the Supreme Court emphasized Justice 
Story’s views . . . . The power to earn a living, the Court said, is a 
“personal liberty,” and: 
from the viewpoint of the wage-earner there is little difference 
between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.  
In short, the same fundamental values which led this Nation to 
abolish debtors’ prisons, also led us to offer debtors a fresh start.46 
Under Chapter 7, a fresh start is available only to those debtors 
willing to relinquish all of their nonexempt assets.47 Chapter 7 debtors 
may keep only their exempt assets, which generally cover basic needs 
like clothing and shelter.48 The relinquished assets are liquidated, and 
the proceeds are distributed to creditors on a priority basis.49 After 
 
debtors a “fresh start”); see also In re Bammer, 112 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The 
Bankruptcy Code is ‘designed to afford debtors a fresh start . . . .’”), withdrawn, 131 F.3d 788 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
 43. 151 CONG. REC. S1836 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 44. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 10–11 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 97. 
 45. 151 CONG. REC. S1836 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 46. Id. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. V. 2005) (providing for the distribution of all of the nonexempt 
assets as property of the estate). 
 48. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (listing assets included in “expenses” and therefore exempt 
from creditors). 
 49. Id. § 726. 
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this distribution, debtors are no longer liable for the remaining debt.50 
“[They] can get back to work or start a new business, flat broke and 
without much in the way of assets, but knowing that the benefits of 
tomorrow’s hard work will not go to the creditors.”51 
Generally, creditors receive less in consumer bankruptcy cases 
filed under Chapter 7 than in those filed under Chapter 13. This is 
true, in part, because debtors who have few present assets can 
discharge their debts under Chapter 7 without making any significant 
payments.52 Creditors have long argued for limitations on Chapter 7, 
especially when debtors with few present assets have the means to 
pay back their loans over time.53 Congress first responded to this 
concern with the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.54 
A. The First Limitations on Chapter 7: The Federal Judgeship Act 
Before 1984, debtors had virtually unfettered access to Chapter 
7.55 Courts could deny them access only “after notice and a hearing 
and only for cause.”56 For-cause dismissals required egregious acts, 
such as making false statements on a bankruptcy petition or 
unreasonably delaying court proceedings.57 As long as debtors were 
honest with the bankruptcy court, they had the option to relinquish 
all their nonexempt present assets in exchange for a total discharge of 
all of their debts under Chapter 7, notwithstanding their financial 
situations.58 
 
 50. Id. § 727 (providing for discharge). 
 51. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 149. 
 52. See § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (requiring only that the debtor relinquish nonexempt assets 
to obtain a Chapter 7 discharge). 
 53. See Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for 
Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2006) (noting that the credit 
industry pushed for limitations on Chapter 7 from 1978 to 1984 and again throughout the 1990s). 
 54. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1982) (“The court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only after 
notice and a hearing and only for cause, including . . . unreasonable delay by the debtor . . . 
[and] nonpayment of any fees and charges . . . .”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793 (noting 
that a debtor would be granted a Chapter 7 discharge except in cases of “specific and serious 
infractions on [the debtor’s] part”). 
 58. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1982) (“The court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only 
after notice and a hearing and only for cause . . . .”). 
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Creditors were understandably uncomfortable with this 
arrangement.59 It allowed debtors who could easily have paid off their 
loans over a few years to opt not to do so by filing for Chapter 7.60 
Consider, for example, a hypothetical young lawyer: just graduated 
from law school, with sixty thousand dollars in credit card debt, no 
nonexempt personal assets, and having accepted a law firm job paying 
one hundred and sixty thousand dollars. Given the high earning 
potential, this young professional could easily pay off the credit card 
debt within a few years. With no nonexempt personal assets, 
however, the lawyer could wipe out the debt in Chapter 7 without any 
personal sacrifice whatsoever. 
In 1984, Congress responded to this situation with the Federal 
Judgeship Act (FJA).61 The FJA gave judges discretion to dismiss 
filings that were a “substantial abuse” of the Bankruptcy Code.62 In 
the FJA, however, Congress gave very little guidance as to what 
constituted substantial abuse.63 As a result, a large body of case law 
developed on the matter.64 By 2005, most circuits had issued decisions 
on the substantial abuse standard.65 
 
 59. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1302 (noting that the credit industry pushed for 
limitations to keep debtors with sufficient disposable income out of Chapter 7 in the years 
leading up to the 1984 Act). 
 60. Before 1984, a debtor’s level of disposable income did not affect whether the debtor 
would be able to file for Chapter 7. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (containing no disposable income requirement). 
 61. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 62. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. V 2005) (“After 
notice and a hearing, the court . . . may dismiss a case . . . if it finds that the granting of relief 
would be a substantial abuse . . . .”). 
 63. E.g., In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 570–71 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 337 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Heller, 160 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 454–56 (5th Cir. 2006) (considering whether 
debtor’s postpetition employment developments should be included in substantial abuse 
determinations); In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that retirement sum 
contributions should be included in disposable income calculations for purposes of substantial 
abuse determinations); In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that purchase 
money mortgage debt was “consumer debt” for purposes of substantial abuse determinations); 
In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 808–09 (10th Cir. 1999) (surveying circuit court case law regarding 
the definition of “substantial abuse” and adopting the “totality of the circumstances” approach); 
In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1999) (comparing the “ability to pay” approach with 
the “totality of circumstances” approach and concluding that “[e]ven under the former 
approach, the debtor’s personal circumstances are relevant to the determination of ability to 
pay”); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 3–5 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the “totality of circumstances” 
test and rejecting “any per se rules mandating dismissal for ‘substantial abuse’ whenever the 
debtor is able to repay his debt out of future disposable income”); In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149 
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In every circuit but one that addressed the question, the primary 
factor in determining substantial abuse was the ability of debtors to 
pay their creditors outside of Chapter 7.66 Courts measured ability to 
pay by deducting the debtor’s reasonable monthly expenses from 
expected monthly income.67 If there was a substantial amount left 
over for the creditors, courts were likely to dismiss the Chapter 7 
petition.68 
When courts determined ability to pay under the FJA, they had 
discretion to adjust reasonable monthly expenses and expected 
monthly income in light of individual circumstances.69 In In re 
Kornfield,70 the Second Circuit noted that “the debtor’s personal 
circumstances are relevant to . . . ability to pay.”71 The court 
explained, “[A] per se test would not survive the first case of a frugal 
family with income over the designated level but with unusually large 
medical expenses necessary to a child’s life.”72 Personal circumstances 
could also weigh in favor of dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition. In In re 
Lamanna,73 the First Circuit held that despite his low income, the 
debtor could not file for bankruptcy.74 Because the particular debtor 
 
(4th Cir. 1996) (employing the “totality of circumstances” approach to find substantial abuse by 
husband who used the bankruptcy system to ensure that his former wife could not collect on a 
debt he owed her); In re Green, 934 F.2d at 570–73 (holding that the fact that debtor had income 
in excess of his necessary expenses was not sufficient to support a substantial abuse 
determination and remanding case for a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”); In 
re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126–27 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding a dismissal on substantial abuse 
grounds and noting that “a court should ascertain from the totality of the circumstances whether 
[the debtor] is merely seeking an advantage over his creditors, or instead is ‘honest,’ . . . and 
whether he is ‘needy’”); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984–85 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding a 
dismissal on substantial abuse grounds because “the courts below properly considered [the 
debtor’s] future income in applying the ‘substantial abuse’ language”). 
 65. See In re Cortez, 457 F.3d at 454–55; In re Behlke, 358 F.3d at 436–37; In re Price, 353 
F.3d at 1139–40; In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796 at 808–09; In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d at 781; In re 
Lamanna, 153 F.3d at 3–5; In re Kestell, 99 F.3d at 149; In re Green, 934 F.2d at 570–73; In re 
Krohn, 886 F.2d at 126–27; In re Walton, 866 F.2d at 984–85. 
 66. Even in the Fourth Circuit, ability to pay was a factor (though not necessarily the 
primary factor) in determining bankruptcy abuse. In re Green, 934 F.2d at 572–73 n.7. 
 67. See, e.g., In re Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127 (evaluating ability to pay based on income and 
reasonable expenditures). 
 68. Id. at 127–28 (dismissing the Chapter 7 petition because the debtor had ability to pay). 
 69. In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d at 781. 
 70. In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 778 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 71. Id. at 781. 
 72. Id. at 783. 
 73. In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 74. Id. at 5. 
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in Lamanna was living with his parents, he had lower expenses and an 
increased ability to pay.75 
Courts developed some general rules of thumb for how to 
determine income and expenses. Expected monthly income could be 
adjusted to take into account postpetition events, such as promotion 
or job loss.76 Also, assets that would be exempt in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, such as retirement distributions, were not necessarily 
barred from reasonable monthly income calculations.77 Finally, 
secured loan payments were not deducted from monthly income in 
determining ability to pay.78 
Even though ability to pay was the primary factor in determining 
abuse in most circuits, in no circuit did ability to pay, standing alone, 
mandate dismissal. Judges always had discretion to consider other 
factors,79 including: 
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden 
illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; 
(2) Whether the debtor incurred cash advances and made consumer 
purchases far in excess of his ability to repay; 
(3) Whether the debtor’s proposed family budget [was] excessive or 
unreasonable; 
(4) Whether the debtor’s schedules and statement of current 
income and expenses reasonably and accurately reflect[ed] the 
true financial condition; and 
(5) Whether the petition was filed in good faith.80 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 77. See In re Koch, 109 F.3d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[R]evenues received from exempt 
sources during the life of a Chapter 13 plan are ‘income,’ the disposable portion of which must 
be paid to unsecured creditors if the plan is to be confirmed . . . .”). 
 78. In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1989) (taking into account the debtor’s high 
monthly mortgage in determining whether the debtor could cut back and pay his creditors). 
 79. The Ninth Circuit in In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988), left open the suggestion 
that ability to pay might per se constitute substantial abuse. Id. at 914–15. It made clear in later 
cases, however, that judges had discretion to allow a Chapter 7 filing even if there was ability to 
pay. In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 80. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). These factors are examples of criteria 
utilized by a court in determining whether substantial abuse exists in a particular case. Courts 
have utilized a variety of criteria under the “totality of the circumstances” standard. See, e.g., In 
re Price, 353 F.3d at 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering the five factors in Green as well as 
“whether the debtor has engaged in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases”); In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 
809 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing “the factors articulated by the other courts as instructive, but 
conclud[ing] [that] they are not inclusive of all factors considered”); In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397, 
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Beginning in the 1990s, creditors became dissatisfied with the 
FJA and began to push for more limitations of Chapter 7.81 
Specifically, creditors wanted a bright-line means test that would 
restrict judicial discretion to allow Chapter 7 filings when the debtor 
had sufficient disposable income.82 
B. More Limitations: The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act 
Despite the FJA’s limitations on Chapter 7, the number of 
bankruptcy filings rose dramatically between 1978 and 2005.83 
Creditors contended that the increase in filings reflected an 
unacceptable decline in financial responsibility and an increased 
willingness to file for bankruptcy.84 Congress answered with the 
BAPCPA, which instituted a mechanized, objective test, known as 
the means test, to determine ability to pay.85 This test, according to 
Congress, would be a more trustworthy tool than judicial discretion in 
rooting out abuse. 
The BAPCPA was intended to prevent bankruptcy abuse by 
“restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy 
system and ensur[ing] that the system is fair for both debtors and 
creditors.”86 Congress enacted the BAPCPA because it felt that 
judicial discretion under the FJA was not sufficient to prevent certain 
debtors from using bankruptcy as a “first resort, rather than a last 
resort.”87 Insofar as the BAPCPA was passed to correct the FJA’s 
 
404 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (noting that Green and similar cases “may be collectively 
summarized as requiring an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the individual case”). 
 81. Braucher, supra note 53, at 1302. 
 82. Credit industry lobbyists expressed concern that bankruptcy judges were unable or 
unwilling to clamp down on abusive debtors. When asked whether judicial discretion was 
sufficient to curb bankruptcy abuse, Jeff Tassey, an influential credit industry lobbyist, replied, 
“They’re part of the . . . problem. . . . They’re not real judges . . . .” Gosselin, supra note 31; see 
also Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 105, 108 (1999) (noting that those who favor means testing generally seek to restrict 
judicial discretion). See generally H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) (providing an example of a 
bright-line means test proposal). 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3–4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90. 
 84. Id. at 4 (citing a growing perception that bankruptcy is used as “a first rather than a last 
resort”). 
 85. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102, 
119 Stat. 23, 27–35 (2005). 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
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failures, it was a response to the perceived inability of the bankruptcy 
bench to recognize and crack down on abusive debtors.88 
The BAPCPA was designed to ensure that no abusive debtor 
slips through the cracks. It requires every debtor to submit means test 
calculations to the court before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.89 The 
U.S. Trustee’s office must then review means test submissions and 
send a statement reporting the test’s outcome to every creditor.90 The 
bankruptcy judge “shall presume abuse exists” if the means test 
shows that the debtor has sufficient income to make meaningful 
payments on the debt.91 
1. Means Test Mechanics.  How exactly does the means test 
evaluate whether debtors have the ability to pay down their debt over 
time? Put simply, the test asks two questions. First, it asks whether a 
debtor’s monthly income is above the median income in the state in 
which the debtor resides.92 If so, the test then goes on to ask whether 
the debtor’s income minus expenses leaves enough money for the 
debtor to make payments to creditors.93 If the answer to both 
questions is yes, the debtor is presumed to be abusing the bankruptcy 
system.94 In the vast majority of these cases, the judge then dismisses 
the Chapter 7 filing.95 
The means test mechanizes both income and expense 
calculations. It provides that current monthly income is the average of 
the debtor’s monthly income from the six months preceding the 
filing.96 All types of income—including employee wages, interest, 
stock dividends, unemployment compensation, and income tax 
refunds—are includable in income determinations.97 If current 
monthly income, as defined by the BAPCPA, is greater than the 
median income in the state in which a debtor resides, the debtor must 
 
 88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005). 
 90. Id. § 704(b)(1). 
 91. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 92. Id. § 707(b)(6). 
 93. Id. § 707(b)(2). 
 94. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 95. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B) (allowing the presumption to be rebutted only under limited “special 
circumstances”). 
 96. Id. § 101(10A). 
 97. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 160. 
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complete the second step of the means test to determine Chapter 7 
eligibility.98 
After a debtor has calculated current monthly income, the means 
test allows a deduction of certain expenses from that amount to 
determine disposable income.99 There are three categories of 
deductible expenses. First, the debtor may deduct certain basic living 
expenses, such as expenses for housing, transportation, taxes, food, 
clothing, and health care.100 The amount a debtor may deduct for 
these expenses is determined by standards set by the IRS rather than 
by the debtor’s actual expenditures.101 Second, debtors may deduct 
payments on secured and priority debts.102 These payments include 
the total of all payments contractually due to secured creditors in the 
five years following bankruptcy and any other “payments to secured 
creditors necessary for the debtor to maintain possession of [a] 
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the 
support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents that serves as 
collateral for secured debts.”103 There is no limit on the amount of 
secured loan payments that a debtor may deduct from income for the 
purposes of the means test.104 Finally, the debtor may deduct actual 
expenses for a limited class of expenses specified by the Bankruptcy 
Code.105 These include the actual cost of reasonably necessary health 
insurance, disability insurance, health savings accounts, and the actual 
cost of protection from domestic violence.106 
The amount of monthly disposable income—which is measured 
by income minus authorized expenses—dictates whether or not a 
debtor passes the means test.107 If disposable income is $100 or less, 
 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005). 
 99. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 100. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 101. See id. (providing that debtors are allowed to deduct the amounts specified in the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Allowable Expense Tables); see also Internal Revenue Service, 
Collection Financial Standards, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007) (showing deductible amounts for basic living expenses). 
 102. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii) (Supp. V 2005). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. (not limiting the amount of deductible secured loan payments); WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164 (“[Secured] loans—such as car loans—can be deducted in 
full, no matter how large, along with any payment arrearages.”). 
 105. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2005). 
 106. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 107. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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the debtor passes the means test108 and may continue Chapter 7 
proceedings without a presumption of abuse.109 If disposable income is 
greater than $166.66, the test identifies the debtor as able to pay,110 
and a presumption of abuse arises against the debtor.111 If disposable 
income is between $100 and $166.66, the debtor passes the means test 
only if the amount of disposable income is less than 0.4167 percent of 
the total unsecured debt.112 Unless income minus expenses is between 
$100 and $166.66, the amount the debtor owes is not relevant to the 
abuse determination.113 
2. When Do Judges Have Discretion to Correct the Means Test?  
When a debtor fails the means test, judges have no choice but to 
presume abuse.114 Section 707(b) of the BAPCPA states that judges 
“shall presume abuse exists if . . . income reduced by . . . expenses [is 
greater than $166.66 per month].”115 Once established, the 
presumption of abuse is extremely difficult to rebut.116 “It may only be 
rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious 
medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed 
Forces.”117 Furthermore, special circumstances are only relevant to the 
extent that they necessarily affect future income or expenses.118 It is 
 
 108. Id.; WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164–65 (translating the statute). 
 109. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing no presumption of abuse when the debtor 
passes the means test). 
 110. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 164–65 (translating the 
statute). 
 111. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005). 
 112. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 165 (providing that if a debtor’s 
disposable income is between $100 and $166.66 per month, the debtor passes the means test 
only if disposable income is less than 25 percent of the unsecured debt divided by sixty). 
 113. See 11 U.S.C § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (not factoring the amount of debt in the determination 
of abuse unless the debtor’s disposable income is between $100 and $166.66). 
 114. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (“In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the 
presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances . . . that 
justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no 
reasonable alternative.”). 
 117. Id. To establish special circumstances that rebut the presumption of abuse, the debtor 
must provide supporting documentation and “a detailed explanation of the special 
circumstances that make such expenses or adjustments to income necessary and reasonable.” 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2005). 
 118. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (noting that special circumstances are relevant to the 
extent “they justify additional expenses or adjustments to current monthly income for which 
there is no reasonable alternative”). 
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not per se a special circumstance, for example, if a debtor files for 
bankruptcy because of a medical emergency. Even if the medical debt 
is completely involuntary and very large, the medical emergency 
counts as a special circumstance only to the extent that it affects the 
debtor’s future income and expenses.119 
Judges have more discretion in the opposite direction, to 
presume abuse when a debtor passes the means test. Section 
707(b)(3) states that when the presumption of abuse “does not arise 
or is rebutted, the court shall consider whether the petition was filed 
in bad faith; or [whether] the totality of the circumstances . . . of the 
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.”120 Courts agree that 
under this provision, judges may dismiss filings when a debtor passes 
the means test but acts in bad faith. It is more questionable, however, 
whether this provision allows judges to dismiss filings when they 
believe that a debtor who passes the means test has ability to pay. 
Some commentators argue that judges do have such discretion 
under the plain language of § 707(b)(3),121 which allows judges to find 
abuse when a debtor passes the means test but the “totality of the 
circumstances of . . . [the] financial situation demonstrates abuse.”122 
Courts that accept this approach123 rely on pre-BAPCPA case law to 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s 
situation demonstrates abuse.124 
Others argue that judges do not have discretion to dismiss filings 
when the debtor passes the means test.125 They contend that the 
means test is the sole measure of ability to pay and that it trumps pre-
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. § 707(b)(3). 
 121. See, e.g., Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff, Judicial Discretion to Find Abuse Under Section 
707(b)(3), 71 MO. L. REV. 1035, 1035–51 (2006) (arguing that a judge has some discretion to 
dismiss filings when the judge believes that a debtor who passes the means test has the ability to 
pay). 
 122. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). 
 123. See, e.g., In re Pak, 347 B.R. 239, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that judges may 
dismiss the petition of a debtor who passes the means test if the totality of the debtor’s financial 
situation demonstrates ability to pay); In re Paret 347 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (same). 
 124. See, e.g., In re Paret, 347 B.R. at 17 (accepting trustee’s argument that even when a 
debtor passes the means test, the debtor can be held to be abusing the Bankruptcy Code based 
on pre-BAPCPA case law). 
 125. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 667 (2005); see also In Re Walker, No. 05-15010-whd, 2006 Bankr. 
LEXIS 845, *20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (holding that courts may not find abuse when 
the debtor passes the means test, even if the debtor becomes able to pay later on). 
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BAPCPA totality-of-the-circumstances case law.126 As Professor 
Elizabeth Warren states, “It is one thing for a judge to be aggressive 
in the interpretation of ‘substantial abuse’ . . . when there are no other 
‘can-pay’ provisions. It is quite something else to look past Congress’ 
specific instructions and add a second judge-made can-pay test.”127 
Regardless of which side of this debate is correct, judges have less 
discretion under the BAPCPA than under the FJA.128 The result is 
that the lets some debtors who are abusing the bankruptcy system 
into Chapter 7 while keeping certain honest but unfortunate debtors 
out. 
II.  WHY THE MEANS TEST WAS A POLICY MISTAKE 
Because the means test replaces judicial discretion with a rigid 
and formulaic rule, it is both over- and underinclusive as to its 
primary goal of preventing abuse. It catches debtors who legitimately 
need relief by failing to take into account why the debtor incurred the 
debt129 and by mechanizing income and expenses in ways that can 
overstate the debtor’s actual disposable income.130 It also creates 
loopholes that allow affluent debtors to qualify for Chapter 7 by 
understating their actual expenses. Finally, although the means test 
replaces a fuzzy standard with a bright-line rule, it is not more 
efficient. The Congressional Budget Office estimates it will cost 
almost $400 million over its first five years.131 
A. The Means Test Catches Debtors Who Legitimately Need Relief 
The means test overshoots its abuse prevention goal by catching 
some debtors who are legitimately in need of relief. It does this first 
 
 126. Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667. 
 127. Id. (quoting e-mail from Professor Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School, to listserv Bankr-UNLV (May 31, 2005, 8:09 CDT)). 
 128. Even if the BAPCPA is interpreted to allow judges discretion to dismiss petitions when 
the debtor passes the means test, the statute explicitly states that judges do not have discretion 
to allow petitions when the debtor fails the means test. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 
2005). 
 129. See generally id. § 707(b)(2) (not factoring into the means test why the debtor incurred 
the debt). 
 130. See id. § 101(10A) (mechanizing the calculation of current monthly income); id.  
§ 707(b)(2) (mechanizing expense calculations). 
 131. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
61xx/doc6130/s256.pdf. 
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by failing to take into account why a debtor incurred debt.132 It thus 
fails to distinguish between a chronic overspender and a family forced 
into bankruptcy by a large and unexpected expense. Second, the 
means test mechanizes the calculations of income and expenses in a 
way that might not reflect the debtor’s actual financial situation.133 
When, because of one of these deficiencies, the means test prevents a 
needy debtor from filing for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge rarely 
has discretion to correct the result.134 
1. The Means Test Ignores the Reason for Filing.  There are a 
variety of reasons, some less sympathetic than others, why a person 
might file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. At one end of the spectrum, a 
debtor might run up one too many credit card bills with new cars and 
expensive jewelry. At the other, a financially responsible person 
might incur overwhelming debt because of a serious medical problem. 
In the middle, a family breadwinner might become unemployed, and 
thus be unable to cover even modest expenses. In light of the 
tradition of American bankruptcy as a last-ditch safety net for the 
“honest but unfortunate debtor,”135 and in light of the legislative goal 
of preventing abuse,136 the law ought to treat these very different 
situations differently. 
Prior to the BAPCPA, it did. Under the FJA, judges had 
discretion to take into account why the debtor was filing for 
bankruptcy when deciding whether to allow the bankruptcy 
petition.137 In In re Green,138 the Fourth Circuit directed lower courts 
to consider the cause of the bankruptcy—“whether the bankruptcy 
petition was filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or 
 
 132. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (not factoring into the means test why the debtor 
incurred the debt). 
 133. See supra note 130. 
 134. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that when a debtor fails the means test, a judge has 
discretion to allow a Chapter 7 filing only under limited special circumstances); Culhane & 
White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing that because the means test is the sole measure of abuse, 
when debtors pass the means test, judges do not have discretion to dismiss their Chapter 7 
filings). But see Wedoff, supra note 121, at 52 (arguing that judges do have discretion to dismiss 
petitions even when a debtor passes the means test). 
 135. See supra note 42. 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92 (noting 
that the BAPCPA will cut down on bankruptcy abuse). 
 137. See supra Part I.A. 
 138. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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unemployment.”139 The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits explicitly 
adopted the Fourth Circuit’s approach.140 Every other circuit that 
addressed the issue agreed that judges were not required to find 
abuse when the debtor had ability to pay; they could look at other 
factors, including the debtor’s reason for filing. Even the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits—which had the most creditor-friendly interpretations 
of the FJA—held that judges had discretion to look at the debtor’s 
reason for filing for bankruptcy.141 
Under the BAPCPA, by contrast, the debtor’s reason for filing is 
generally irrelevant. The reason for filing never affects whether a 
debtor passes or fails the means test.142 In limited situations, the 
reason for filing can affect whether the presumption of abuse is 
rebuttable: the BAPCPA allows a debtor to rebut the abuse 
presumption under “special circumstances, such as a serious medical 
condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces.”143 
These special circumstances, however, are relevant only insofar as 
they affect the debtor’s income or expenses.144 A good reason for 
filing is irrelevant unless it affects the debtor’s presumed income or 
expenses in the future.145 Generally, therefore, bankruptcy judges 
have no choice but to treat the most sympathetic debtor—one who is 
financially responsible but falls down-and-out due to a bout of 
unexpected bad luck—in the same manner as a chronic and 
manipulative overspender.146 
Consider, for example, a financially responsible accident victim 
who incurs eight hundred thousand dollars in accident-related 
medical expenses.  Over the course of a few years, the victim recovers 
and gets back to work—taking home $170 in disposable income per 
 
 139. Id. at 572. 
 140. In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 809 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 781 (2nd 
Cir. 1999); In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). 
 141. In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that although ability to pay 
standing alone is sufficient to prove abuse, it does not necessarily lead to that finding); In re 
Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984–85 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 143. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the presumption is rebuttable under special 
circumstances, which are generally circumstances in which the debtor has a good reason for 
filing for bankruptcy). 
 144. Id. (stating that the presumption may be rebutted under special circumstances only “to 
the extent such special circumstances that [sic] justify additional expenses or adjustments of 
current monthly income”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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month—but begins to realize that this is not enough to pay off even 
the interest on the medical debt.147 Facing an impossible situation, the 
debtor files for bankruptcy but fails the means test because the past 
medical emergency affects neither future income nor future expenses.  
The accident is therefore not a special circumstance sufficient to rebut 
the means test result.  The bankruptcy judge—unable to consider 
either the large size of the debt or the sympathetic reason for filing—
must deny this debtor a Chapter 7 chance for a fresh start.148 
2. The BAPCPA Mechanizes Income and Expense Calculations 
in Ways that Can Overstate Disposable Income.  Another way that the 
BAPCPA keeps needy debtors out of Chapter 7 is by mechanizing 
income and expense calculations in ways that can overstate actual 
income and understate actual expenses.149 The means test can 
overstate income because it presumes that current monthly income is 
the average of a debtor’s monthly income in the six months prior to 
filing.150 This presumption wrongly assumes that all debtors have a 
constant stream of income in the months before and after their 
bankruptcy filing, which is just the time when many debtors are 
experiencing financial dislocations.151 
The presumption can be problematic for debtors who file for 
bankruptcy because they have lost their jobs and cannot find new 
ones with comparable salaries.152 In those situations, the means test 
has the potential to overstate current monthly income by factoring in 
a debtor’s old salary.153 To determine current monthly income, the 
 
 147. At the modest rate of 8 percent, the first month’s interest on an $800,000 debt would be 
$5,351.20. 
 148. Debtors who cannot file for Chapter 7 are not always allowed to use Chapter 13 as an 
alternative. If they have too much unsecured debt, they will be forced out of bankruptcy 
entirely. 11 U.S.C.A § 109(e) (2007) (limiting Chapter 13 bankruptcy to debtors with less than 
$336,900 of unsecured debt). In that situation, debtors could end up paying off their creditors 
for the rest of their lives. 
 149. See supra note 130. 
 150. See id. § 101(10A) (defining current monthly income as the average income of the six 
months prior to filing). 
 151. Income loss (downsizing, job loss, or other salary reduction) is the most common 
reason why people file for bankruptcy, followed by medical problems and divorce. WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 120. 
 152. There are many debtors who fall in this category. See id. (discussing some of the 
reasons debtors file for bankruptcy). 
 153. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (factoring in salary from the six months prior to filing). 
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means test looks backwards to the six months prior to filing.154 If 
unemployed debtors are not savvy enough to wait six months after 
losing their jobs to file for bankruptcy, the means test will take their 
old salaries into account in determining current income.155 The sooner 
debtors file for bankruptcy after losing their jobs, the more their old 
salaries will factor in the means test, and the worse the overstatement 
of current income will be.156 
Before the BAPCPA, judges had discretion to consider 
postpetition developments in determining income and expense.157 If a 
debtor had lost a job and filed for bankruptcy, the judge could 
consider developments in the debtor’s employment situation that 
occurred after the filing but before the bankruptcy hearing.158 It was 
relevant whether the debtor had found a new job, and whether the 
new job paid more or less than the old one.159 Under the BAPCPA, 
however, judges look only to the six months prior to filing to 
determine the debtor’s income.160 If that number comes out too high, 
judges do not have discretion to make a correction.161 
Another problem is that the means test can understate actual 
expenses, thereby overestimating the ability of debtors to pay back 
their creditors.162 The BAPCPA determines allowable expenses by 
reference to IRS allowable expense tables, whether or not these 
amounts reflect actual reasonable expenses.163 Only in limited 
enumerated situations may debtors include their actual expenses in 
means test calculations.164 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra note 153. 
 156. See supra note 153. 
 157. In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court may consider 
postpetition events). 
 158. See id. (“[T]he court is entitled to focus on subsequent developments in the debtor’s 
financial condition.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Supp. V 2005). 
 161. If the debtor fails the means test, the judge has no choice but to presume abuse. Id.  
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i). That presumption may be rebutted only under “special circumstances, such as 
a serious medical condition or a call to active duty in the Armed Forces.” Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 162. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that means test expenses are based on IRS tables, 
rather than the actual reasonable expenses of the individual debtor). 
 163. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the . . . amounts 
specified under the National Standards and the Local Standards . . . .”). 
 164. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that the debtor may include certain enumerated actual 
expenses, including expenses for reasonably necessary health and disability insurance, expenses 
reasonably necessary to protect the family from family violence, expenses for care or support of 
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The IRS publishes the allowable expense tables for “use in 
calculating the repayment of delinquent taxes.”165 A delinquent 
taxpayer is allowed to keep a certain level of income per month for 
subsistence needs, but must turn the rest over to the IRS.166 The 
allowable expense tables tell how much income the delinquent 
taxpayer may keep.167 The IRS separates allowable expenses into 
three categories: housing and utility costs, transportation costs, and 
other costs.168 For housing and utility costs, the allowable expense 
level differs by county, depending on the real estate market.169 
Similarly, the allowable transportation expenses differ by region.170 
All other allowable expenses (food, housekeeping supplies, apparel, 
and services) have national levels. Oddly, these expense levels go up 
as a delinquent taxpayer’s income goes up.171 Although a person who 
makes less than $833 per month may only keep $175 per month for 
food, a person whose monthly income is at least $5834 may keep 
almost three times that amount!172 
There are two reasons why the means test potentially understates 
actual reasonable expenses by reference to the IRS tables. The first is 
a flaw in the IRS tables themselves: what could justify allowing 
people who have less monthly income to keep significantly less 
money for food? The discrepancy across income ranges suggests that 
the IRS tables might shortchange low income debtors, allowing them 
less than reasonable expenses.173 
The second problem with using the IRS tables is in the way the 
means test applies them. The expenses in the table were designed to 
be used as a floor.174 When the IRS uses the tables for delinquent 
 
an elderly or chronically ill person, and expenses of up to fifteen hundred dollars per child for 
education). 
 165. Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, http://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. A person whose monthly income exceeds $5833 may keep $483 per month for food. Id. 
 173. Alternatively, it is possible that the IRS tables allow high income debtors more than 
their reasonable expenses. 
 174. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 163 (“[T]he IRS uses these guidelines as a 
floor . . . leav[ing] some room for agents to . . . permit people to spend more for their basic living 
expenses if there seems to be a good reason to do so . . . .”). 
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taxpayers, it allows the taxpayers to show that they have reasonable 
expenses in excess of the table amount.175 The means test, however, 
limits debtors to an upward adjustment of 5 percent of the table 
amounts.176 It does not consider expenses over that amount, even if 
they are necessary in the debtor’s situation.177 
B. The BAPCPA’s Loopholes Let Abusive Debtors off the Hook 
Not only does the BAPCPA block access to Chapter 7 for certain 
needy debtors, it also creates loopholes that allow well-informed 
debtors to pass the means test, even though they have the ability to 
pay back their debts. First, because of the mechanical way that the 
means test determines current monthly income, debtors who 
generally have high incomes can pass the means test by reducing their 
income for a short period of time prior to filing.178 Second, the means 
test allows unlimited deductions for secured loan payments.179 
Debtors who know this ahead of time can reduce their disposable 
income, as determined by the means test, by tying up their monthly 
income in secured loan payments.180 When a debtor uses one of these 
loopholes to pass the means test, it is debatable whether the 
bankruptcy judge has discretion to prevent the Chapter 7 filing.181 It is 
ironic that the savvy (and likely more affluent) debtors who can take 
 
 175. Id. at 162–63 (noting that the IRS explains on its website that “[i]f the IRS determines 
that the facts and circumstances of your situation indicates [sic] that using the scheduled 
allowance of necessary expenses is inadequate to provide for basic living expenses, we will allow 
for your actual expenses. However, you must provide documentation that supports a 
determination that using national and local expense standards leaves you an inadequate means 
of providing for basic living expenses.”). 
 176. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 2005) (“[I]f it is demonstrated that it is 
reasonable and necessary, the debtor’s monthly expenses may also include an additional 
allowance for food and clothing of up to 5 percent.”). 
 177. See id. (limiting the upward adjustment to 5 percent). 
 178. See id. § 101(10A) (looking only to the six months prior to filing to determine current 
monthly income). 
 179. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 180. See id. (allowing for unlimited secured loan deductions). 
 181. Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing thatjudges do not have discretion to 
dismiss the Chapter 7 filing when a debtor passes the means test). But see Wedoff, supra note 
121, at 52 (arguing that judges do have discretion to dismiss petitions even when a debtor passes 
the means test). 
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advantage of these loopholes are exactly the people who Congress 
intended to keep out of Chapter 7 when it passed the BAPCPA.182 
1. Manipulating Income.  The means test defines current 
monthly income as the average of the debtor’s income in the six 
months preceding the bankruptcy filing.183 As discussed, this 
definition of income can overstate actual income when a debtor files 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy within six months of becoming 
unemployed.184 Well-informed debtors, however, can use the rigid 
definition of income to their advantage, manipulating the means test 
to understate their income.185 Consider a debtor who loses one job but 
has the ability to easily find another. This debtor will have a period 
without any income—after losing the first job but before finding the 
second. If the time between jobs is at least six months, and if the 
bankruptcy filing occurs at the end of this period, the current monthly 
income at the time of the bankruptcy petition will be zero, and the 
debtor will easily pass the means test, even with high earning 
potential and encouraging job prospects.186 Attorneys who represent 
consumer debtors are well aware of this phenomenon and know how 
to use it to their clients’ advantage.187 
 
 182. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92 
(justifying the BAPCPA in part to close “loopholes . . . that allow and—sometimes—even 
encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse”). 
 183. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Supp. V 2005). 
 184. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how the means test overstates income); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 101(10A) (factoring old salary into current monthly income when laid-off workers file 
for bankruptcy within six months of losing their jobs). 
 185. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316 (noting the different ways in which debtors might 
reduce their incomes before filing). 
 186. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (defining current monthly income as the average income in 
the six months before bankruptcy and not considering earning potential or job prospects in the 
determination of current monthly income). 
 187. See, e.g., Posting of Kevin Chern to The Bankruptcy Lawyers’ Blog: Surviving 
Bankruptcy Reform and Bankruptcy Law Changes, http://blog.startfreshtoday.com/2005/09/ 
articles/bankruptcy-means-test/when-it-comes-to-income-timing-is-everything/ (Sept. 14, 2005, 
19:49 EST) (“If your client notifies you of a sudden increase in income, a quick filing may be in 
your client’s best interest. If you wait two months after the income change, the six-month 
average may increase by enough to bring your client above the median income for the debtor’s 
household, triggering application of the means test. You may want to file 
quickly . . . . Conversely, if your client has a sudden decrease in income, before filing, you should 
reassess whether the means test applies. By waiting a month to three months, the debtor’s six-
month average income may decrease by enough to eliminate the application of the means 
test.”). 
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2. Deductions for Secured Loan Payments.  A potentially more 
dangerous loophole in the means test is the unlimited deduction for 
secured loan payments. In calculating disposable income, the 
BAPCPA allows debtors to deduct their average monthly payments 
on account of secured debt.188 Deductible payments include “the total 
of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in 
each month of the 60 months following the date of the petition,”189 
and “any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the 
debtor, in filing . . . under Chapter 13 . . . to maintain possession of [a] 
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the 
support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”190 
A debtor should be able to deduct payments on a secured loan 
taken out to pay for a basic need, such as a modest home or car. 
Expenses for basic needs are deductible under the IRS expense tables 
when the debtor pays for them outright.191 There is no reason why 
those same basic expenses should not be deductible when financed 
with a secured loan. For example, a renter who files for bankruptcy 
can deduct reasonable rent under the IRS allowable expense tables.192 
It is only fair, then, that homeowners who file for bankruptcy be able 
to deduct their reasonable mortgage payments. Financing decisions 
should not affect a debtor’s ability to file for Chapter 7. 
The problem arises because secured debts do not have to be 
reasonable to be deductible.193 Any amount “contractually due to 
secured creditors” is deductible, even if the debtor takes out the loan 
to purchase a totally unreasonable luxury item.194 A debtor who takes 
out a secured loan to buy a piece of jewelry, for example, may deduct 
the payments on that loan from income.195 A debtor who pays for the 
jewelry outright is, of course, out of luck: the IRS tables do not allow 
deductions for luxury jewelry expenses.196 Prior to the means test, the 
 
 188. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2005). 
 189. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
 190. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II). 
 191. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 192. Internal Revenue Service, Collection Financial Standards, www.irs.gov/individuals 
/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 193. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2005) (allowing deduction of all secured loan 
payments). 
 194. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). 
 195. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (allowing for the deductibility of secured loan payments, 
regardless of reasonableness). 
 196. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 165 (allowing only basic expenses). 
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FJA did not give payments on secured loans such special treatment. 
They were deductible only to the extent that they were reasonable 
under the debtor’s circumstances.197 
The problem with the secured loan deduction is not only that it 
treats debtors with mostly secured debt much better than debtors 
with mostly unsecured debt. More seriously, it also allows 
unscrupulous debtors to shelter their income by taking out secured 
loans before filing for bankruptcy.198 Consider two debtors, both of 
whom want to file for Chapter 7, and both of whom have a monthly 
income of $5000, which is just above the median income in their 
respective states. One attempts to file for Chapter 7 as is, but fails the 
means test because a monthly income of $5000 is too high.199 The 
other takes out a secured loan with payments of $1000 per month. 
When filing for bankruptcy, the second debtor will be able to deduct 
the $1000 from what would otherwise be that individual’s disposable 
income.200 This may be enough to allow the second debtor to pass the 
means test.201 
3. Judicial Discretion to Correct the Means Test When the 
Debtor Passes.  Because the means test has loopholes which 
sometimes allow affluent debtors to pass, the question of whether 
judges have discretion to find abuse when a debtor passes the means 
test is critical. There is a debate as to the degree of discretion that 
judges have to find abuse when a debtor passes the means test.202 
Everyone agrees that judges have discretion to find abuse when a 
debtor files in bad faith.203 A debtor’s use of the loopholes discussed in 
the previous section, however, may be considered either bad faith or 
legitimate bankruptcy planning, depending on the degree of income 
and expense manipulation. What happens when a debtor passes the 
 
 197. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1989) (taking into account the debtor’s high 
monthly mortgage in determining whether the debtor could cut back and pay his creditors). 
 198. Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316. 
 199. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005) (setting forth the means test). 
 200. See id. § 707(b)(2)(iii) (allowing deductions for secured loan payments). 
 201. See id. § 707(b)(2) (basing means test results on disposable income, which is income 
minus expenses). Of course, if debtors are too brazen with their plans, they will have to worry 
about judges finding bad faith and dismissing their cases under § 707(b)(3), which allows judges 
to dismiss any bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith. Id. § 707(b)(3). 
 202. See sources cited supra note 181. 
 203. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (explicitly stating that judges may dismiss a bankruptcy 
petition filed in bad faith). 
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means test only because of one of its loopholes, but the debtor’s 
actions do not rise to the level of bad faith? 
Section 707(b)(3) states that when the presumption of abuse 
“does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider whether the 
debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or [whether] the totality of the 
circumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates 
abuse.”204 Some commentators argue that under the plain language of 
this provision, judges have discretion to find abuse when a good faith 
debtor passes the means test.205 Others disagree, arguing that if a 
debtor passes the means test, a judge must allow the bankruptcy 
petition unless it was filed in bad faith.206 If judges do not have 
discretion to find abuse when a good faith debtor passes the means 
test, loopholes become an even more serious problem.207 
C. The Means Test as Red Tape 
One defense commonly offered in favor of bright-line rules like 
the means test is that although they do not always get the correct 
result, they are more efficient.208 Although this may be true generally, 
it is not true in the case of the means test. The means test has 
tremendously complicated the process of filing for bankruptcy, and 
the Congressional Budget Office estimates that in its first five years, it 
will have increased budget deficits by almost $400 million.209 
This expense is primarily the result of increased administrative 
requirements for both filers and the government.210 Under the 
BAPCPA, debtors must submit evidence of any payment received 
 
 204. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). 
 205. See Wedoff, supra note 121, at 52 (arguing that under the plain language of the statute, 
judges have discretion to dismiss petitions even if the debtor passes the means test). 
 206. See Culhane & White, supra note 125, at 667 (arguing that because the means test is the 
sole measure of abuse, judges do not have discretion to dismiss petitions when a debtor passes 
the means test). 
 207. Congress ought to change income and expense calculations to crack down on these 
loopholes. See infra Part III.B–C. If Congress is unwilling to do that, however, it becomes 
essential to allow judges discretion to find abuse when a debtor uses a loophole to pass the 
means test. 
 208. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 63 (1992) (“[R]ules promote economies for the legal decisionmaker by minimizing the 
elaborate, time consuming, and repetitive application of background principles to facts.”). 
 209. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 131, at 1. 
 210. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1308 (noting the ways in which the 2005 Act creates 
more paperwork for debtors and their attorneys). 
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from an employer during the sixty days prior to filing.211 Furthermore, 
each debtor must submit a tax return and a certificate of notice of 
various credit counseling services.212 These are the least of the means 
test’s administrative burdens. Under the BAPCPA, even the poorest 
of debtors must submit a Form B22A means testing calculation to file 
for bankruptcy.213 The U.S. Trustee’s office then reviews every means 
test result and sends a statement of its findings to every creditor.214 
Then, for every above-median debtor, the Trustee’s office must either 
move to dismiss the Chapter 7 petition,215 or if the Trustee’s office 
decides not to make such a motion, make a statement explaining its 
decision.216 
As this Part has discussed, the BAPCPA makes life unnecessarily 
difficult for debtors who honestly need the bankruptcy system, it 
opens up loopholes for those sophisticated enough to manipulate the 
bankruptcy system, and it costs taxpayers money. But what can be 
done to address these problems? The next Part proposes revisions to 
the BAPCPA that would make the Act both less costly and more 
effective at achieving its primary abuse prevention goal. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Congress should revise the means test to allow judges more 
discretion in identifying abusive debtors. The most effective revision 
would be a compromise between the BAPCPA’s bright-line means 
test and the FJA’s fuzzy substantial abuse standard. Congress should 
continue to dictate the acceptable level of disposable income and 
propose generally acceptable expenses. At the same time, however, 
Congress should delegate to judges the authority to determine 
disposable income for each debtor by adjusting allowable expenses 
upward or downward given individual circumstances. Also, judges 
should have discretion to disallow deductions for unreasonable 
secured loans. Finally, Congress should allow debtors to rebut the 
presumption of abuse whenever they incurred their debt because of 
an unforeseen emergency. This compromise would create a more 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 2005). 
 214. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 165. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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effective and efficient system for screening abusive debtors out of 
Chapter 7. 
A. Keep the Basics: Codify the Acceptable Level of Disposable 
Income 
First, in administering the compromise, Congress should retain 
the most basic tenet of the means test—the presumption of abuse 
when disposable income exceeds a certain amount. As demonstrated 
by the BAPCPA, Congress wants to keep out of Chapter 7 those 
people who have enough disposable income to make substantial 
payments outside of bankruptcy.217 This general policy was also 
evident in pre-BAPCPA case law.218 Congress should continue to 
state explicitly exactly how much disposable income it considers 
enough to make substantial payments. Under the means test, the 
magic number is between $100 and $166.66 per month, depending on 
the total amount owed by the debtor.219 These numbers should remain 
law; they give judges a usable, quantitative standard for making abuse 
determinations without necessarily imposing administrative costs or 
unfairness.  
B. Allow Judges to Determine Income and Expenses 
Second, Congress should change the way in which the means test 
determines income and expenses. Congress should repeal the means 
test’s rigid definition of current monthly income and instead allow 
bankruptcy judges to determine monthly income based on the 
debtor’s individual circumstances.220 In making this determination, 
judges should be able to consider postpetition events—such as 
changes in a debtor’s employment situation—that the means test fails 
to take into account. This would prevent overestimation of income 
 
 217. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 88 (noting 
that the BAPCPA is intended to ensure that debtors repay the “maximum they can afford”). 
 218. See supra note 64–68 (noting that in every circuit but one, ability to pay was the 
primary factor in determining abuse). 
 219. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005). 
 220. The means test defines current income as the average of the debtor’s income in the six 
months prior to filing. When debtors file for bankruptcy because they have lost their jobs and 
cannot find new ones with comparable salaries, this approach tends to overstate actual income 
by factoring in a debtor’s old salary. On the other hand, when debtors lose their jobs but have 
the potential to find other jobs that pay just as much or more, this approach tends to understate 
actual income by factoring in the months when a debtor was not employed. See supra Part 
II.A.2. 
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when debtors lose their jobs and are unlikely to find other jobs with 
comparable salaries. It would also cut down on the ability of abusive 
debtors to shelter their income by strategically timing their petition. 
Finally, allowing a bankruptcy judge to determine income would cut 
down on the burdensome paperwork involved with Chapter 7. 
Congress should also change the means test’s definition of 
allowable expenses. the means test determines allowable expenses by 
reference to the IRS allowable expense tables.221 But these tables are 
flawed in that they discriminate across income ranges. Congress 
should create a revised version of the IRS expense tables in which 
allowable expenses stay consistent throughout income ranges. Judges 
could use this revised table as a starting point for determining what 
expenses will be allowed in the disposable income calculation. 
Another problem with the means test’s use of the IRS tables is 
that judges may not consider actual necessary expenses more than 5 
percent above the table amount.222 But income should not be deemed 
disposable if it is used to pay necessary expenses. There are very good 
reasons why one debtor might have greater necessary expenses than 
another. Congress therefore ought to amend the law to allow debtors 
to prove actual necessary expenses in excess of the 5 percent limit. 
C. Close the Secured Loan Loophole 
Third, Congress should limit the deduction for secured loan 
payments to cover only payments on loans taken out to finance 
reasonable expenses. This would make Chapter 7 fairer by treating 
debtors with secured loan payments in the same manner as debtors 
with payments on unsecured loans. It would also shut down one 
major loophole that affluent debtors can use to shelter their income.223 
As discussed in Part II, a debtor should not be allowed to deduct an 
unlimited amount for payments on secured loans, regardless of 
whether he took those loans out to pay for unreasonable luxury items 
or necessary goods. 
 
 221. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See Braucher, supra note 53, at 1316 (explaining the loophole created by the unlimited 
secured loan deduction). 
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D. Allow Judges to Consider the Reason for Filing 
Finally, Congress ought to make the presumption of abuse 
rebuttable whenever debtors incur their debt because of an 
unforeseen emergency, even if the emergency does not alter their 
income or expenses. Under the BAPCPA, the presumption of abuse 
is rebuttable only to the extent that special circumstances affect the 
debtor’s income and expenses.224 To prevent unfairness to debtors 
with good reasons for filing,225 the presumption ought to be rebuttable 
whenever the debtor has a special circumstance, regardless of whether 
future income or expenses will be affected. 
Once the debtor rebuts the presumption of abuse, the 
bankruptcy judge must determine whether to allow a Chapter 7 
petition in spite of the debtor’s disposable income. In making this 
decision, judges ought to consider the burden that not being able to 
file will have on the debtor226 and whether the debtor could have 
foreseen and planned for the special circumstance that led to the 
filing. They should, in other words, balance the creditors’ interests 
against the debtor’s need for a fresh start. 
CONCLUSION 
Abandoning judicial discretion in favor of a rigid means test was 
a policy mistake. The means test allows some debtors who are 
abusing the bankruptcy system into Chapter 7 but keeps certain 
honest but unfortunate debtors out. Moreover, it adds another layer 
of red tape to an already complicated bankruptcy process. Congress 
should change the law to allow judges more discretion in identifying 
abusive debtors. Not only would this cut down on the BAPCPA’s 
administrative burden, it would further the BAPCPA’s primary goal 
of preventing abuse. Discretion, however, is not a cure-all. Prior to 
the BAPCPA, bankruptcy judges had too few guidelines as to when 
Chapter 7 was appropriate. This led to disparate decisions among the 
circuits. In such an environment, debtors like Kim Basinger were able 
to squirm out of their obligations. 
 
 224. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 225. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing debtors who have sympathetic reasons for incurring 
debt, such as a medical emergency). 
 226. In evaluating this burden, judges should consider whether the debtor is able to file for 
Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C.A § 109(e) (2007) (limiting Chapter 13 to debtors who owe less than 
$336,900 of unsecured debt). 
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Thus, Congress should find a compromise between the confusion 
that existed under the FJA and the rigid and unforgiving means test. 
Congress should give judges guidelines by indicating the acceptable 
level of disposable income and promulgating a revised version of the 
IRS tables. At the same time, it should allow judges to determine 
disposable income for each debtor and adjust necessary expenses 
upward or downward given individual circumstances. Judges should 
also have discretion to disallow deductions for unreasonable secured 
loan payments. Finally, debtors should be able to rebut the 
presumption of abuse whenever they incurred debt because of an 
unforeseen emergency. Such a compromise would go a long way 
toward keeping debtors like Kim Basinger out of bankruptcy while 
leaving debtors like Shirley Nichols with their time-honored chance 
for a fresh start. 
